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General Trojan horse attacks on quantum key distribution systems are analyzed. We illustrate the
power of such attacks with today’s technology and conclude that all system must implement active
counter-measures. In particular all systems must include an auxiliary detector that monitors any
incoming light. We show that such counter-measures can be efficient, provided enough additional
privacy amplification is applied to the data. We present a practical way to reduce the maximal
information gain that an adversary can gain using Trojan horse attacks. This does reduce the
security analysis of the 2-way Plug-&-Play system to those of the standard 1-way systems.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
The prominent application of quantum information sci-
ence is Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), which, to-
gether with quantum random number generators, is the
most advanced realization of quantum devices operating
at the single quanta level[1]. QKD offers the potential to
develop for the first time in human history provenly se-
cure communication channels between distant partners.
The latter should be connected by a so-called quantum
communication channel, i.e. a channel able to transmit
individual quantum systems well enough isolated from
the outside world such that the receiver gets them almost
unperturbed. In practice these quantum communication
channels can be realized, among others, with standard
telecom optical fibers or with free space in line-of-sight
optical channels. In both cases the transmitted individ-
ual systems are photons. Quantum physics, in particular
the no-cloning theorem (a form of the famous Heisenberg
uncertainty relations, suitable for the analysis of QKD)
guarantees that
1. the presence of any eavesdropper on the quantum
communication channel can be detected by the le-
gitimate users, and
2. the legitimate users can upper bound the informa-
tion that any eavesdropper could gain by eaves-
dropping the quantum communication channel.
Consequently, the legitimate users can lower bound
the amount of privacy amplification they need to
apply on their data in order to reduce the eaves-
dropper’s information to an exponentially small
value.
Accordingly, quantum physics guarantees potential[24]
security against any possible attack on the quantum com-
munication channel[2, 3, 4, 5, 6].
Today a lot is known about the most powerful attacks
Eve could ever perform against the quantum channel,
assuming Eve has absolutely no technological limits, i.e.
she can do everything that quantum physics does not ex-
plicitly forbid. But, clearly, Eve’s attacks are not limited
to the quantum communication channel. For instance,
Eve could attack Alice or Bob’s apparatuses, or she could
exploit weaknesses in the actual implementation of ab-
stract QKD.
Quantum physics does not help protecting Alice and
Bob’s apparatuses. Indeed, as soon as the information
is encoded in a classical physics system, it is vulnerable
to copying and broadcasting. Hence, Alice and Bob’s
electronics has to be protected by classical means. Inter-
estingly, one may ask where the transition from quantum
coding to classical coding happens. This is an old ques-
tion, the famous quantum/classical foggy transition, but
here in a modern setting: it determines what can be pro-
tected by quantum means and what has to be protected
by classical means. But we shall not consider this ques-
tion in this article. It is anyway obvious that Alice and
Bob’s apparatuses need classical protections.
Actual implementations of abstract QKD uses today’s
technology (and economical constrains). Hence they nec-
essarily move somewhat away from the ideal scheme. It
is thus of vital importance for QKD to analyze properly
the consequences of these compromises. Indeed, some
compromises might render the entire system totally in-
secure, while some other compromises can be proven to
maintain absolute security, provided their analyzes are
properly taken into account. Let us stress this important
point: some well implemented compromises do not at all
reduce the security of QKD[7, 8, 9, 10].
An example of a very common and convenient compro-
mise is the use of weak laser pulses instead of the single-
photon sources that are closer to abstract qubits. This
was first shown to open new eavesdropping strategies[11,
12]. Next, it has been proven that secure QKD is never-
theless possible, provided the weak intensity of the pulses
and the quantum communication channel loss are prop-
erly taken into account[7, 8, 9, 10]. Finally, recently,
variations of the basic QKD protocols have been pro-
posed that significantly lighten the conditions for secure
QKD using weak laser pulses[13, 14, 15].
It is thus timely to study another unavoidable aspect
of QKD: the quantum channel itself is a potentially open
door for an eavesdropper into Alice and Bob’s appara-
2FIG. 1: Principle of a Trojan Horse attack. Eve occupied
part of the quantum channel (i.e. the spatial, temporal and
frequency modes) to probe Alice’s apparatus. Eve uses an
auxiliary source, modulates it and analyzes the backscattered
signal with a detector. Note that her detection scheme can
rely on specificities of her auxiliary source, for instance on its
phase. Eve may have to remove part of the legitimate signal,
compensating the introduced loss by an improved quantum
channel.
tuses. Indeed, even if this door is properly designed, Eve
could use it precisely at the same time as the legitimate
users: Eve could send into Alice and/or Bob’s appara-
tuses light pulses during the (short) times the quantum
channel is open[25], see Fig. 1. In order to limit this
possibility, the system should be designed in such a way
that
1. only light at appropriate wavelength can enter (i.e.
filters),
2. the ”door” should be open only during short times,
i.e. the encoding optical components should be ac-
tive only during short times (i.e. activate phase
modulators only when the qubits is there), and
3. the amount of reflected light that could be exploited
by Eve is bounded by a known value.
The purpose of this article is to analyze such attacks,
known as Trojan horse attacks. In particular we shall
examine each of the above points in section III. But,
first, it is useful to get a better understanding of the
techniques that such an adversary could use, see section
II. Next, in section IV we derive the photon number
statistics of any light used in Trojan horse attacks and in
V we compute the maximal information that Eve could
gain using Trojan horse attacks, i.e. compute how much
additional privacy amplification is required in order to
successfully combat such attacks. Finally, in section VI
we present a simple way to reduce this information, hence
to increase the secret bit rate.
II. REFLECTOMETRY
Every optical element backscatters some amount of any
incoming light. This might be small in optical fibers
(about -70dB/m) and angle-polished connectors (typi-
cally -40dB), medium for integrated optics components,
like phase-modulators (≈ −20 dB) and large for mirrors
(≥-1 dB).
Consequently, every optical apparatus can be exam-
ined from the outside by shining into it well controlled
light and analyzing the backscattered light. This tech-
nique, named reflectometry, is a standard tool for optical
engineers.
For security analysis of QKD one assumes an Eve with-
out any technological limit. But it is useful to have an
idea how the technique works in principle and to illus-
trate it with today’s technology.
There are essentially two approaches to reflectometry:
1. Send in short optical pulses and analyze the
backscattered light intensity in function of time.
From the known speed of light, the time can be
translated into distances. This technique is called
Optical Time Domain Reflectometry (OTDR),
it is a very standard tool of optical telecom
engineers[16, 17] (see figure 2).
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FIG. 2: Functional schematic of OTDR
2. Send in coherent cw light while scanning its op-
tical frequency and analyze the spectrum of the
backscattered light. Different reflections corre-
spond to different emission times, hence to differ-
ent optical frequencies. They do thus produce a
beat signal. Usually one produces on purpose one
relatively large reflection (inside the instrument)
which acts as a local oscillator. The frequency of
the backscattered signal can be translated into dis-
tance by a Fourrier transformation. This technique
is called Optical Frequency Domain Reflectometry
(OFDR). It is not yet as standard as OTDRs, but,
thanks to its heterodyne detection scheme, it holds
the potential of a much larger sensitivity and dy-
namical range[18] (see figure 3).
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FIG. 3: Functional schematic of OFDR
The main drawback of todays OFDRs compared to
OTDRs is their limited distance range, due to the finite
coherence length of the cw laser. But, as Eve has no
technological limits, we shall mainly illustrate the poten-
tial of Trojan horse attacks using this technique. Let us
emphasize that this section is only an illustration, clearly
the counter measure by Alice and Bob should take into
account reflectometry techniques beyond today’s tech-
nique.
Fig. 4 and 5 present the backscattered light from Al-
ice and Bob’s apparatuses, respectively, in the case of
our Plug-&-Play quantum cryptography system[19, 20].
They illustrate that indeed quite a lot of information can
be gained by probing the apparatuses from the outside.
Let us emphasize that the same is true for all other fiber-
based apparatus, like for instance optical amplifiers[21]
and any other quantum cryptography system. The de-
tails are given in the figure captions. Note that for the
purpose of this demonstration, we removed the about 10
km long delay line in Alice’s apparatus, because our laser
(contrary to that of Eve) has a coherence length limited
to about 1 km).
Note that it isn’t yet clear how Eve could probe the
setting of the phase-modulator. However, Eve can in-
deed probe this setting by exploiting the change in bire-
fringence in Titan-indiffused LiNbO3 integrated waveg-
uides, as illustrated in Fig. 6. For different kinds of phase
modulators, or polarization modulators, it is highly likely
that a similar technique applies. Figure 6 shows that it is
easy to distinguish between two phase settings of Alice’s
phase modulator. To obtain Fig. 6 we had to keep the
phase setting constant during about one second, that is,
a much longer time than in the usual use of the crypto
system. We also had to adjust the polarization of the
probe light and to use a polarization dependant OFDR
settings, to maximize the effect. Nevertheless, this result
underlines that Trojan horse attacks have to be analyzed
seriously.
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FIG. 4: Example of an OFDR trace of Alice’s Plug-&-Play
QKD system in which we removed the delay line and set the
variable attenuator to its minimal value. A sketch of the op-
tical circuit is displayed at the top with the corresponding
reflections peaks below. The beam splitter (BS), connector
(C), variable attenuator (VA), detector (D), phase modulator
(PM) and Faraday mirror (FM) are all clearly visible. The
peak marked R correspond to an example of multiple internal
reflections. The peaks marked with a cross correspond to spu-
rious reflections between the OFDR and Alice’s components.
III. HARDWARE COUNTER MEASURES
The previous section demonstrated that Trojan horse
attacks on badly designed system can be performed us-
ing today’s techniques. Consequently, every proper im-
plementation should take care that:
1. the ”door” lets in only wavelengths close to the
operating wavelength. Any other probe should be
eliminated by properly designed filters, and
2. the ”door” should be open only during a time as
short as possible: the phase modulator, or polar-
ization modulator, or whatever coding device is
used, should be activated only during the short
time when the legitimate signal is there.
But even these two measures can’t completely prevent
Trojan horse attacks. Indeed, Eve can multiplex her
probe signal with the legitimate signal either in polar-
ization (if time-bin qubits are used by Alice and Bob) or
in wavelengths (Eve could reduce the loss of the Q chan-
nel, filter out a part of the legitimate signal and use this
bandwidth for her Trojan horse attack, see fig. 1). Also,
in practice, timing has a finite accuracy, hence Eve can
add her probes immediately before or after the legitimate
pulses.
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FIG. 5: Example of an OFDR trace of Bob’s Plug-&-Play
QKD system. Similar to Fig 4, but with the additional com-
plication that each peak appears 3 times, because the incom-
ing and reflected light both split in two, following the short
and long path of the interferometer. For instance, one can
notice that the long arm of the interferometer is about 11.5
meters longer than the short arm.
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FIG. 6: OFDR traces of an integrated optics phase modula-
tor. Two different phase settings give raise to clearly distin-
guishable back-scatterings on the output face of the modula-
tor. The two phase settings and the polarization of the probe
light are chosen especially to exhibit a very clear effect. The
measurement time is of about one second.
Consequently, a first conclusion is that every sensitive
apparatus (Alice for sure, Bob depending on the proto-
col) must have an active control on the intensity of
the incoming light: they should use an auxiliary detec-
tor and monitor any incoming light. The software should
be designed such as to stop QKD as soon as anormal
intensities are detected (actually, for each qubit, there
should be a test!).
A first naive idea to circumvent the need for an aux-
iliary detector is the use of attenuators and/or isolators.
However, since Eve is not limited by technology, she could
merely send in more intense light[26].
A second idea could be the use of an ”optical fuse”, i.e.
a device that cuts the quantum channel if a to intense
beam passes through it. This is a delicate technological
problem. Indeed, there is no such fuse operating for ultra-
short pulses. Hence, this does not seem like a practical
idea, though one should keep it in mind.
In practice there is a natural fluctuation in the le-
gitimate light and real detectors and electronics also
contribute to the fluctuation of the monitoring signal.
Hence, being conservative, one has to evaluate how much
light can go to Eve without being detected and how much
information she could extract from it. Then, appropri-
ate privacy amplification should be applied to Alice and
Bob’s data. The amount of necessary privacy amplifica-
tion for any bounded probe by Eve is computed in the
next section.
IV. STATISTICS OF EVE’S PROBE LIGHT
One may question which state of light Eve should use
in order to maximize her information gain. However, it is
a well known fact that losses tend to turn any state into a
state whose photon number statistics is Poissonian. This
is illustrated on Fig. 7 for the cases of 10 and 20 dB
losses (i.e. transmissions of 0.1 and 0.01, respectively)
and mean photon number, after attenuation, µ = 0.5.
Since all quantum cryptography systems (should) have
attenuators and/or isolators attenuating any light used in
a Trojan Horse attack even more severely, it is sufficient
to consider light with Poissonian statistics.
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FIG. 7: Comparison of photon-number distribution for pois-
sonian and binomial distribution of the same average value.
µ: average number of photons; t: transmission factor for Eve’s
probe light, corresponding e.g the the attenuation at Alice’s
input; n: number of photon in the Eve’s Fock-state probe
light.
5Note that this does also imply that Eve can’t signifi-
cantly affect the statistics of the photon number emitted
by Alice in the Plug-&-Play configuration, even if she
replaced the intense coherent pulse send by Bob by a
squeezed state. We ellaborate on this is section VII.
V. EVE’S POTENTIAL INFORMATION GAIN
In this section we use well-known formulas to quantify
the information that Eve can extract from a weak coher-
ent state when she knows the ”basis”. Note, first that
because of the huge attenuation that any trojan horse
probe light undergoes, it will always return to Eve in a
state extremely close to Poissonian, as described in the
previous section IV. At best, from Eve’s point of view,
it bears some coherence, that is, it is a coherent state.
Note furthermore that because of the vacuum compo-
nent of the weak coherent state, the two states corre-
sponding to the ”basis” are not orthogonal. Explicitly,
Eve has to distinguish between the following two states
|α〉⊗|0〉 and |0〉⊗|α〉. The measurement that maximizes
her information gain is known[22] and provides her with:
I
Trojan
Eve (|α|2) = 1−H(p) (1)
where
p =
1
2
(
1 +
√
1− |〈α, 0 | 0, α 〉|2) (2)
=
1
2
(
1 +
√
1− exp (−2|α|2)) (3)
≈ 1 +
√
2|α|
2
, (4)
and H denotes the binary entropy. Hence:
I
Trojan
Eve (|α|2) ≈
1
ln(2)
|α|2 +O(|α|4) (5)
where 1ln(2) ≈ 1.443. This information gain is presented
graphically in Fig 8.
Surprisingly, this is larger than the probability that the
weak pulse is non-empty:
Prob(non empty) = 1− exp (−|α|2) ≈ |α|2 (6)
The reason for this difference is that eq. (2) assumes that
Eve does really hold a coherent state, i.e. that she holds
a phase reference relative to which α is defined. This ob-
servation leads to a possible way to reduce Eve’s maximal
information gain, as discussed in the next section.
VI. WAY TO REDUCE EVE’S INFORMATION
Figure 1 illustrates how Eve should probe Alice and/or
Bob’s apparatus in order to gain as much information
about their internal settings. Since Eve’s gain can be
significant, Alice and Bob have to sacrify a significant
fraction of their raw key before obtaining a secret key.
It is thus of great interest to them to find ways to limit
Eve’s information. One possibility that we present in this
section, consists in Alice or Bob randomizing the phase
of |α〉 relative to Eve’s reference. In this way, Eve does
no longer hold |α, 0〉 or |0, α〉, depending on the internal
setting of the apparatus, but holds the mixed state ρ0 or
ρ1, respectively, where:
ρ0 =
∫ 2pi
0
dθ
2pi
|eiθα, 0〉〈 eiθα, 0 | (7)
=
∑
n≥0
P
(
n| |α|2) · |n, 0〉〈n, 0 | (8)
ρ1 =
∫ 2pi
0
dθ
2pi
|0, eiθα〉〈 0, eiθα | (9)
=
∑
n≥0
P
(
n| |α|2) · |0, n〉〈 0, n | (10)
where P
(
n| |α|2) = |α|2n
n! e
−|α|2 denotes the Poisson prob-
ability distribution. Eve optimal measurement distin-
guishing ρ0 and ρ1 is also known. Eve first measures
the photon number. If she finds no photon, she clearly
gains no information. However, whenever she finds one
or more photon, then she gains full information. Hence
her optimal information gain equals the probability that
the weak coherent state |α〉 is not empty:
IreducedEve (|α|2) = 1− P (0| |α|2) = 1− exp (−|α|2) ≈ |α|2
(11)
Interestingly, IreducedEve (|α|2) < ITrojanEve (|α|2); it is thus
of practical value for Alice and Bob to add random phases
to any light that might get back-scattered. Let us em-
phasize that, clearly, these random phases act as irrele-
vant global phases on the qubits, hence do not affect the
proper operation of QKD, but these random phases are
relative to any possible reference that Eve might hold,
hence do reduce by the significantly factor 1ln 2 ≈ 1.44
the maximal information that Eve could gain using this
back-scattered light[23].
VII. REDUCTION OF SECURITY ANALYSIS
OF 2-WAY SYSTEMS TO 1-WAY SYSTEMS
In a 2-way quantum cryptography system, like the so-
called Plug-&-Play configuration [19, 20], Eve may hold
the strong pulse that enters Alice’s apparatus. Let’s write
ψ =
∑
n≤0 cn|n〉 its state, where |n〉 denotes a state of
n photons in some appropriate mode. Note that we as-
sume a pure state, i.e. that the phase reference, relative
to which the complex amplitudes cn are defined, is clas-
sical. It is straightforward to general the analysis to the
case where Eve’s reference is a quantum state, i.e. Eve
sends into Alice’s apparatus a state entangled with an
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FIG. 8: Eve’s optimal information gain per qubit in func-
tion of the mean photon number |α|2 that she can collect
without being detected by Alice and Bob. The upper curve
corresponds to eq. (1), the lower curve to the case that Al-
ice and/or Bob applies phase randomization, eq. (11). For
example, if Alice’s monitoring detector sets a limit to Eve’s
backscattered signal of 0.1 photon, then Eve may gain 0.135
and 0.095 bits if Alice doesn’t apply or applies phase random-
ization, respectively.
auxiliary state held by Eve. We like to show that phase
randomization, as presented in the previous section, to-
gether with the effect of strong attenuation on the photon
number statistics, as presented in section IV, allows one
to reduce the security analysis of 2-way quantum cryp-
tography systems to that of 1-way systems, like those
analyses in [7, 8, 9, 10]. Formally, phase randomization
separates Eve’s state ψ into a mixture of Fock number
states:
ρrand.ph. =
∫
dΦ
2pi
∑
n,m≥0
eiΦ(n−m)cnc
∗
m|n〉〈m |
=
∑
n≥0
|cn|2|n〉〈n | (12)
Next, denoting t the transmission coefficient of Alice’s
apparatus (go and return), one has:
ρrand.ph.Att. =
∑
m≥0
|qm|2|m〉〈m | (13)
where
|qm|2 = tm
∑
n≥m
(
n
m
)
|cn|2(1 − t)n−m (14)
Accordingly, the probability of a multi-photon pulse is:
Prob(m ≥ 2) =≪ n(n− 1)≫ t
2
2
+O(t)3 (15)
where ≪ ...≫ denote the average. For a coherent input
state ψ, one recovers: Prob(m ≥ 2) = ≪n2≫t22 = µ
2
2 . For
a Fock state ψ = |N〉, one obtains, possibly surprisingly,
a lower multi-photon probability: Prob(m ≥ 2) = (N2−
N) t
2
2 <
µ2
2 .
Note again that the phase randomization separates Al-
ice from any possible reference-system that Eve might
have prepared. Consequently, provided Alice randomizes
the global phase of each qubit, measures the incoming
intensity of each pulse and introduces sufficient atten-
uation, she can bound the probability of she sending a
multi-photon pulse to Bob; hence Alice and Bob can ap-
ply the standard security proofs to their 2-way system.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Trojan horse attacks should be considered for ev-
ery QKD systems. These include single-photon, weak
laser pulses and continuous variable implementations,
as all necessarily include a quantum channel that ”en-
ter” into the legitimate users apparatuses. Note that
for single-photon sources, Alice doesn’t use any attenua-
tor, contrary to the weak pulse implementations. Hence,
Trojan horse attacks are especially dangerous for such
single-photon systems. For the Plug-&-Play system, the
amount of reflected light is larger than for most alter-
native systems. Hence, the pressure on Eve’s attacking
system is reduced.
To counter such attacks, all QKD apparatuses should
be properly designed, with filters and carefully designed
timing. Additionally, auxiliary monitoring detectors
must be implemented, if not the QKD system is inse-
cure, irrespective of the quality of the source. Note that
for the Plug-&-Play systems, first presented in [19], Alice
does already have such an auxiliary detector.
The accuracy of this monitoring detector determines
how much privacy amplification has to be applied in or-
der to defeat Trojan horse attacks. In section VI we
presented a simple way to reduce this amount, hence to
achieve larger secret keys.
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